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Abstract
Some developed countries have used unilateral trade sanctions against 
governments that have allegedly been engaged in gross violations of human 
rights as a tool to force such governments to comply with basic human rights 
standards. Even though unilateral trade sanctions might be targeted against 
governments that grossly violate human rights, such measures have unintended 
consequences on the general population who live in the target country. In many 
cases, the general population suffers as a result of such sanctions rather than the 
public officials who are the targets. Hence, the effectiveness of such measures 
in meeting the desired result is questionable. Such measures have been utilized 
by countries that are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) thereby 
raising the issue of the legality of such measures under the WTO rules. The two 
main issues that surround unilateral trade sanctions are thus the legality of such 
measures under the WTO rules and the effectiveness of the measures to meet 
the desired result. I argue that unilateral trade sanctions on grounds of human 
rights violations are neither permissible under the WTO rules nor effective 
weapons to achieve the goals (i.e. forcing governments to comply with basic 
human rights standards).
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Introduction
Some Western countries have been utilizing unilateral trade sanctions as a 
means to combat human rights abuses in target countries.* 1 However, the use of
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1 The US, Canada, and the European Union have all used different forms of trade 
sanctions against some governments that have allegedly been in gross violations of 
human rights. The US has imposed Sanctions against Burma, Cuba, and Zimbabwe.
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trade sanctions in general and unilateral trade sanctions in particular has become 
increasingly controversial.2 The dispute over unilateral trade sanctions does not, 
however, relate to the purpose intended to be achieved, i.e. the objective of 
promoting human rights, but rather to the question of whether these sanctions 
are the most effective weapons to achieve the goals.3 while some have regarded 
unilateral trade sanctions as an alternative way of defending human rights in 
target countries, there are concerns that such measures do not bring about the 
desired result but might rather inflict undesirable consequences on the general 
population.4 Furthermore, the efficacy of trade sanctions as a tool to promote 
human rights has evoked the debate over the relationship between trade 
measures and human rights.5
Targeted countries and countries that take such measures are mainly 
members of the wTO, and this has evoked the question of the legality of trade 
sanctions under the wTO. Apart from the controversy on the effectiveness of
Canada has also imposed sanctions against Burma and zimbabwe. Moreover, EU has 
also imposed unilateral trade sanctions against Burma, and zimbabwe. See generally 
Margaret Doxey (2009), ‘‘Reflections on the Sanctions Decade and Beyond’’, 64 
International Journal at 539. For further explanation on some of the sanctions, see the 
last section of this article.
2 Trade sanctions can generally be divided into unilateral and multilateral sanctions. 
Multilateral sanctions are imposed by all countries in a given sanctions phenomenon 
and such sanctions are supported by the international community. On the other hand, 
unilateral sanctions are imposed by a country acting on its own /acting alone and may 
not have international support. See Thihan Myo Nyun (2008), ‘‘Feeling Good or 
Doing Good: Inefficacy of the US Unilateral Sanctions against the Military 
Government of Burma/Myanmar’’, 7 Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review 455 at 465.
3 Id., at 457.
4 Holly Cullen (1999), “The Limits of International Trade Mechanisms in Enforcing 
Human Rights: The Case of Child Labour”, The International Journal of Children’s 
Rights, Vol.7 at 1.
5 Trade measures related to human rights can be “inwardly directed” or “outwardly 
directed.” Inwardly directed trade measures are targeted towards ensuring that human 
rights are not violated within ones own territory. For instance, prohibition of 
importation of meat products for a certain period on grounds that the meat products 
imported from a given country can bring about health related problems (issues of 
human right to health) is an “inwardly directed” measure. On the other hand, 
outwardly directed trade measures, or commonly known as sanctions are targeted 
towards ensuring promotion of human rights in other countries. If the US takes trade 
measures against Syria aimed at promoting human rights in the country, the measure 
becomes “outwardly directed”. The main focus of this article is on the latter measure. 
For further explanation on types of human rights related trade measures, see Jenny 
Schultz and Rachell Ball (2007), ‘‘Trade as a Weapon? The WTO and Human Rights- 
Based Trade Measures”, Deakin Law Review, Vol. 12, No.1, at 43-44.
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such measures in inducing respect for human rights, the legality of the measures 
under the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules is questionable. The 
discussion in this article mainly focuses on WTO rules governing trade in 
goods. it is argued that unilateral trade sanctions against member countries on 
grounds of human rights violations are neither permitted under WTO rules nor 
effective mechanisms to ensure respect for human rights.
The first section of the article discusses the relationship between trade and 
human rights. This section provides some historical background to the 
relationship between trade and human rights in the context of the WTO. The 
second and third sections deal with the extent to which the WTO rules permit 
countries to take trade measures against other countries that do not comply with 
basic human rights standards. The last section discusses the ineffectiveness of 
unilateral trade sanctions to ensure that human rights are respected in other 
countries. it explores some of the trade sanctions that have been taken by 
western countries and assesses whether such measures have been effective in 
achieving the intended goals.
1. Historical Background on the Relationship between 
Trade and Human Rights
international trade law and international human rights have developed 
independently.6 The early international trade agreements did not accommodate 
issues that specifically deal with human rights. The human rights-trade link was 
almost absent in the early negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (the GATT 1947). The only instance that can be taken as probably linking 
trade with human rights was the negotiations on labour issues during the early 
GATT period.7 Even so, it was not clear whether the negotiations on labour 
issues in the early GATT period were undertaken out of concern for human 
rights or purely targeted towards economic gains.8
6 Thomas Cottier (March 2002), “Trade and Human Rights: a relationship to Discover”, 
5 Journal of International Economic Law 111 at 112.
7 Labour issues are considered as human rights issues. Hence, the negotiations on issues 
related to labour may give us some clue on how issues of the human rights-trade link 
have been viewed by member countries in the history of the GATT 1947 and 
subsequently the GATT 1994.
8 Concern for labour issues may be viewed from different perspectives. some argue that 
labour standards should be protected out of concern to avoid child labour, forced 
labour, prison labour, etc. so that no person should be subject to exploitation. This 
concern that emanates from the idea that everyone’s human rights should respected 
and protected. On the other hand, some argue that labour standards should be uniform 
out of fear that lower labour standards would enable some countries to produce 
products with lower cost. The price of such products may be lower as compared with 
the price of products that are manufactured in countries that have higher labour
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The International Trade Organization (ITO) Treaty was the first instrument 
that addressed labour issues in the context of a multilateral trade agreement.9 
ITO never came into force. Instead, the GATT 1947 served as a transitional 
agreement until the WTO was established in 1994. However, Article VII of the 
ITO Charter still gives us some clue on whether the drafters had human rights 
issues in mind or were simply concerned with economic implications of labour. 
Article VII of the Charter provides:
The Members recognize that measures relating to employment must take 
fully into account the rights of workers under intergovernmental declarations, 
conventions and agreements. They recognize that all countries have a 
common interest in the achievement and maintenance of labour standards 
related to productivity, and thus in the improvement of wages and working 
conditions as productivity may permit. The Members recognize that unfair 
labour conditions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties in 
international trade, and, accordingly, each Member shall take whatever 
action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its 
territory.10
As can be seen from the above provision, the drafters seem to have had some 
concern for the rights of workers and labour conditions in general. However, 
their main concern appears to be on labour conditions that have impact on the 
competitiveness of products in the international market. The last sentence of the 
provision, allows members to take measures that would eliminate conditions of 
unfair labour if it creates difficulties in international trade. Hence, the primary 
concern the ITO Charter was how to create fair competition in international 
market rather than ensuring human rights were respected.
The ITO Charter (Havana Charter) was not ratified and eventually 
abandoned after 1950.11 With the failure to adopt the Havana Charter, the parties 
to the agreement resorted to negotiations on tariff concessions. This has given 
rise to GATT 1947 which did not contain a provision comparable to Article VII 
of the Havana Charter.
standards. Hence, the products manufactured in countries with higher labour standards 
will be at a disadvantage in terms of market access. Therefore, the countries that have 
higher labour standards favour uniform application of such standards, not out of 
concern for respecting and protecting human rights but for fear that their products 
would otherwise be at a disadvantage.
9 Elissa Alben (2001), “GATT and the Fair Wage: A Historical Perspective on the 
Labor-Trade Link”, 101 Columbia Law Review 1410 at 1430.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
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The issue of labour re-emerged under the GATT 1947 in 1952 when Japan 
applied for accession to the GATT 1947.12 The labour standards of Japan were 
criticized mainly by the US and Britain who were reluctant to endorse Japan’s 
application to accede to the WTO. Their concern was based on unfair 
competition from Japanese products that would be manufactured by “unfair 
labour standards”.13 Hence, the negotiators of GATT 1947 did not want to link 
trade with labour rights in particular and human rights in general.
in the period after the early negotiations until the establishment of the WTo 
(1994), the human rights-trade link was not a major agenda in the international 
trade arena since countries have diverging views on the issues, and majority of 
the countries vehemently rejected the incorporation of labour standards into the 
GATT 1947.14
The creation of the WTO in 1994 generated a reaction across a wide range of 
groups in many countries on the ground that it has not taken or should take into 
account non-trade issues such as human rights and environment.15 More 
specifically, the introduction of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT 1994) gave rise to a debate into the relationship between trade and 
human rights.16
The link between international trade and human rights has become an issue 
of increasing interest for developing and developed countries, non-governmental 
organisations (NGos) and international organizations. interestingly, scholarly 
opinion is divided on the issue whether WTo Agreements imply any clear 
linkage between international trade and human rights. While some argue that 
trade sanctions can lawfully be imposed on human rights grounds, others 
challenge such arguments. The following section briefly forwards the legal 
framework under the WTo and the major points invoked in support of and 
against such arguments.
12 Id at 1432.
13 Britain’s products were facing a potential flood of imports of products made with 
cheaper Japanese labor. The US also had concern with labor standards of Japan on 
ground of ‘unfair’ trade competition. The negotiators also continuously referred to 
the possibility that Japan could use lower labor standards as affecting competition of 
foreign markets. See Alben, supra note 9, at 1433-1444.
14 Salman Bal (2001), “International Free Trade Agreements and Human Rights: 
Reinterpreting Article XX of GATT”, 10 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 62 at 
66.
15 See generally Sara Dillon (2002), “A Farewell to Linkage: International Trade law 
and Global sustainability Indicators”, 55 Rutgers Law Review 87.
16 Carlos Manual Vazquez (2003), “Trade sanctions and Human Rights- Past, Present, 
and Future”, 6 Journal of International Economic Law 797 at 801.
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2. Trade Measures and Human Rights under the GATT 
1994
2.1 Provisions Relevant to Human Rights Related Trade 
Measures under the GATT: Legal Framework
The most relevant WTO rules regarding trade measures related to human rights 
are Articles I, III, XI, XX and XXI of GATT 1994. Articles I and III lay down 
non-discrimination rules. Article Xi of the GATT governs the prohibition of 
quantitative restriction (both import and export) subject to few exceptions. 
Article I of the GATT provides the Most-Favoured-Nation treatment (MFN) 
principle. It stipulates that “...any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for 
any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like 
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting 
parties”.17 According to this principle, products of a country should be treated 
equally with like products of other WTO members.18
Article III deals with national treatment (NT) principle. It provides that any 
internal charges, laws, regulations or requirement related to products of a 
contracting party should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as 
to afford protection to domestic production.19 Articles I and III of the GATT 
generally prohibit discrimination of products from a member country either as 
compared with products of third contracting parties or as compared with 
products of the country taking the measure. Hence, if any human rights related 
trade measure is inconsistent with Article I and III, it must be justified under the 
exceptions. Otherwise, it would be illegal under the GATT.
17 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, , Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization (April, 1994); results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Negotiations, Article I(1). ( Hereinafter the GATT )
8 Assume that Country X - a developed country takes trade measures against Country 
Y (by way of imposing higher tariffs on some products that originate from Country Y 
while it imposes lower tariff to other contracting parties) in order to discourage the 
flow of trade from Country Y in response to human rights violations in Country Y. 
This measure would violate the MFN principle. The question then becomes whether 
Country X can justify its measure by other WTO rules, particularly Article XX of 
GATT.
19 GATT 1994, Article III (I). A country that discriminates between its products and 
products from a contracting party on the basis that the products from the member 
contracting party have been produced in violations of human rights or on grounds of 
gross human rights violations in the country in general would violate Article III of the 
GATT. For such measure to be legal under the WTO, it should be justified by another 
rule of the WTO that may be an exception to Article III of the GATT 1994.
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Article XI of the GATT which deals with prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions provides:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, 
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other 
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the 
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or 
on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory 
of any other contracting party.20
Hence, contracting parties are prohibited from banning products totally from 
entering into their own territory or imposing quota restrictions on products that 
enter to their territory. Restrictions on the exportation of products into the 
territory of other contracting parties are also prohibited. There are exceptions 
provided to this prohibition. However, recourse to trade measures for promotion 
of human rights in other countries is not included under the list of exceptions.21
in light of the above discussion, the imposition of trade restrictions against 
contracting parties on the basis of human rights violations outside the territory 
of a country violates the major principles mentioned above unless the measure is 
justified by Articles XX and XXI which embody exceptions of the GATT. If 
trade measures related to human rights fall within the scope of Article XX and 
XXI exceptions, such measures would not be illegal under the WTO rules even 
when they might be inconsistent with the basic principles of the GATT. 
However, whether such measures fall within the Article XX or XXI exceptions 
remains controversial. Let us first see the content of Article XX before further 
examining whether such measures can be justified. Article XX of GATT in part 
reads:
General Exceptions
subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to 
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
20 GATT 1994, Article XI(1).
21 The Exceptions provided under Article XI(2) include: Export prohibitions or 
restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs 
or other products essential to the exporting contracting party; Import and export 
prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the application of standards or regulations for 
the classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade; Import 
restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any form, necessary 
to the enforcement of governmental measures and other exceptions include 
restrictions to safeguard the balance of payments (Article XII) and safeguards to 
protect domestic industry (Article XIX) of the GATT.
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(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(e) relating to the products of prison labour;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption;
Two requirements should be fulfilled to justify a measure under Article XX. 
Firstly, the measure must fall under the list of exceptions provided under Article 
XX (a-j). Secondly, the measure must meet the conditions stipulated in the 
introductory phrase of Article XX (commonly known as the chapeau). As can 
be seen from Article XX reproduced above, human rights values are not 
expressly stated under the list of exceptions. The question thus becomes whether 
human rights violations can, by means of interpretation, be within the scope of 
Article XX list of exceptions. The following section discusses the arguments for 
and against.
2.2 Arguments for Trade-human Rights Link on the basis 
of Article XX Interpretation
Some argue that Article XX of the GATT 1994 can be a legal backdoor for the 
protection of human rights. For instance, Salman Bal argues that there is a direct 
and appropriate relationship between international trade and the protection of 
human rights.22 According to Bal, a look at the provisions of GATT Article XX 
(a), (b), (d) and (e) reveals that these WTO rules can be used to protect human 
rights. Article XX is an exception to the provisions of GATT. Members can 
derogate from other obligations provided that they satisfy the requirement of the 
chapeau and there is a necessity to protect public morals (Article XX (a)), to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health (Article XX (b)), to secure 
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the 
provision of this agreement (Article XX (d)) and relating to the products of 
prison labor (Article XX (e)). According to Bal, although the provisions do not 
explicitly mention human rights, the list of exceptions under Articles XX(a), (b), 
(d) and (e) are indicative of the fact that non-trade issue can be given priority 
over free trade.23 Bal states that the wording of the provision such as public 
morals, human life, and products of prison labour can be interpreted to 
accommodate human right issues.
22 Bal, supra note 14, at 63.
23 See generally Bal, supra note 14.
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Powell also argues that there is a room to implement human rights in the 
WTO. He argues that the aim of the WTO is not limited to promoting free 
trade. It is also concerned with non-trade issues. He states that although the 
WTO mainly aims to encourage economic growth through free trade, it also 
gives space to non-trade issues because “the preamble to the Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the WTO does not make free trade an end in itself, but a 
means to fulfil basic human rights such as the improvement of global standards 
of living, promotion of sustainable development, and preservation of the 
environment”.24 Powell advances the view that the terms such as ‘global 
standard of living’ and ‘promotion of sustainable development’ can be 
interpreted to accommodate human rights.
Powell further argues that Article XX can be a back door to defend the 
implementation of human rights through the WTO. This provision enumerates 
different public welfare policies the WTO members may take even in a situation 
where the measures may restrict trade.25 Therefore, members are given the right 
to take some actions which could derogate from the rules of the WTO in order 
to protect human life or health. The concern for human health and life indeed 
verifies the concern for human rights. Moreover, the fact that the WTO 
Agreements on sanitary and Phytosanitary and on Technical Barriers to Trade 
allow countries to take trade measures needed to protect human life or health is 
another evidence that WTO does not have free trade as an end in itself.26 Powell 
also makes reference to some of the flexibilities under the Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement to support his view 
regarding the place of human rights in the WTO system. Hence, the provisions 
of these different WTO Agreements clearly involve human rights.27
Likewise, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann contends that human rights can be a 
legally relevant context for the interpretation of WTO rules. According to 
Petersmann, the WTO appellate body has consistently decided that international 
customary law and Article 3.2 require an interpretation of WTO rules in good 
faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. He thus contends
24 Stephen J. Powell (2004), “The Place of Human Rights Law in World Trade 
Organization Rules”, 16 Florida Journal of International Law 219 at 221.
25 Id, at 222.
26 See generally Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (April, 1994); 
results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. See also Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade. It is important to note that there are procedures to be 
followed before taking action on the basis of the above agreements.
27 Powell, supra note 24, at 223.
that this means of interpretation leads to the conclusion that some WTO 
provisions can be interpreted to defend human rights.28
2.3 Arguments against Human Rights Related Trade 
Sanctions Under the GATT
Other scholars argue that the wTO rules do not authorize countries to take 
outwardly directed trade measures (to which the author of this article 
subscribes) on grounds of human rights violations.
The list of exceptions under Article XX which may be relevant to human 
rights related trade measures are Article XX (a), (b) and (e). Article XX (a) 
embodies the notion of public morals exception. There is no definition provided 
as to what constitute public morals. The question of what violates public morals 
seems to be determined by each country as there is no universal standard of 
what constitute public morals. what is moral in one country can be immoral in 
another country. This exception has also hardly been applied or mentioned in 
reports of the Dispute settlement Body (DSB). The notion of public morals has 
only been discussed once by the Dispute Settlement Body in US - Gambling 
services case29 Even then, it was not an interpretation of public morals under 
Article XX (a) of the GATT but rather was an interpretation of the public morals 
exception under Article XIV of General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). The panel in this case noted that public morals and public orders “can 
vary in time and space, depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing
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28 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2004), “The ‘Human Rights Approach’ Advocated by the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and by the International Labour 
Organization: Is It Relevant for WTO Law and Policy?”, 7 Journal of International 
Economic Law 605 at 608. Incidentally, Petersmann also calls for institutional change 
of WTO so that it can incorporate human rights issues. He argues that WTO (like 
EC), can and should become an advocate not only for economic freedom but also 
promotion of human rights. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2000), “The WTO 
Constitution and Human Rights”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.3, 
Iss.1 at 19. According to Petersmann, human rights should be recognized in laws such 
as the WTO that facilitate global integration so as to require governments to protect 
and promote human right in all policies across national frontiers. He argues that the 
WTO should take lessons from the regional experiences in Europe and should stop 
focusing on one-sided trade liberalization. He rather contends that global integration 
law in the WTO must advance not only economic efficiency but also human rights 
protection and promotion. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2002), “Time For a United 
Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide 
Organizations: Lessons from European Integration”, 13 European Journal of 
International Law 621 at 622.
29 United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Hereinafter US-Gambling case).
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social, cultural, ethical and religious values”. It also stated that in applying these 
concepts “[m] embers should be given some scope to define and apply for 
themselves the concepts of 'public morals' and 'public order' in their respective 
territories, according to their own systems and scales of values”.30
Given the fact that the definition and application of public morals will differ 
according to the circumstances of each country, it would be difficult to equate 
the concept of public morals to human rights that have universal recognition. 
Hence, the concept of public morals under Article XX (a) hardly refers to the 
human rights discourse.
Proponents of the argument that human rights can be taken into account 
under international trade rules mainly invoke Article XX(b) of the GATT. one 
of their main arguments is that the phrase ‘necessary to protect human health or 
life’ can accommodate human right issues. However, it is important to note that 
‘necessary to protect human health or life’ does not necessarily address issues of 
human rights. This is not to suggest that all issues related to public health and 
life are out of the realm of human rights because there are indeed human health 
and life issues that may be regarded as human rights.
In line with the above arguments, Robert Howse contends that relying on 
Article XX of GATT to show that human rights are accommodated under the 
WTO is flawed.31 According to Howse, the existing exceptions in Article XX of 
the GATT refer to a wide range of policy objectives that may or may not be 
regarded directly referring to human rights.32 He further posits that the WTO 
Appellate Body would find it very difficult to appreciate the relevance of human 
rights to a WTO’s member’s defense of its policies based on Article XX of 
GATT. Accordingly, he argues the different rulings of the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) do not imply that Article XX of the GATT can be relevant to
human rights.33
30
31
32
US-Gambling case, paragraphs 6.459-461.
See generally Robert Howse (2002), “Human Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, 
What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann” European Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 13 No.3. Howse has written in response to Petersmann’s proposition that the 
WTO should be transformed into a ‘constitutionalized organization’ modelled on the 
European Community so that the WTO can effectively deal with matters of not only 
trade but also human rights.
Id.
33 Howse notes that “[t]he extent to which environmental concerns are appropriately 
translated into the notion of 'environmental rights' is quite controversial, and in the 
presence of this controversy, and given the institutional context of the WTO, the 
Appellate Body might well be inclined to take a cautious or conservative view.” He 
also argued that in the Shrimp/Turtle case the “Appellate Body did not link the notion 
of conservation of exhaustible natural resources to human rights values” See Howse, 
supra note 31 at 656.
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Alston also doubts the appropriateness of enforcing human rights through the 
WTO. He contends that the power and objectives of the WTO are narrowly 
focused around the goal of expanding the production of trade in goods and 
services. Alston observes that the WTO law, as it stands now does not have 
mandate over issues of human rights.34
While it is fair to say that the list of exceptions under Article XX of the 
GATT (such as public health) refer to protection of the human right to health, its 
application is limited in the sense that derogation from the WTO rules can be 
made only to address public concerns within domestic jurisdiction. In other 
words, even when the above lists of exceptions are interpreted to refer to the 
human rights language, the trade restrictions to be applied by members should 
only be imposed to address policy objectives within one’s own territory and not 
to address human rights concerns in the territory of other countries. This is 
because, as shall be explained under section 3, members cannot impose trade 
measures to promote social concerns outside their own territory (jurisdiction). 
Article XX does not warrant extraterritorial application.
Article XX(e) allows members to take trade measures relating to the products 
of prison labour. This provision is probably the only exception under Article XX 
where members may take trade measures to address problems outside their 
territory. This implies that members may take trade measures to address human 
rights concerns in general and labour standards in particular in other countries.
However, the historical context suggests otherwise. It suggests that “the 
object and purpose of this provision is not a humanitarian one, i.e. to prohibit 
prison labor in general, but to protect competition of national products produced 
with regular work force, which are of course more expensive than products 
produced with prison labor.”35
Moreover, a close look at the drafting history of the provisions of the GATT 
does not support the assertion that human rights were part of the GATT. The 
principles of interpretation in international law as enshrined in the Vienna
34 Philip Alston (2002), “Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by 
Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 
13, No. 4, at 30. Alston wrote the article in reply to Petersmann’s proposal that 
human rights can effectively be enforced through the WTO. He further argues that 
enforcement of human rights through the WTO is not appropriate. He also raises 
many defects of the WTO that limits its competence to deal with human right issues. 
He argues that the interests of many stakeholders is not represented and “its 
institutional structure, its processes and the outcomes it sanctions are far from what 
would be required of a body to which significant human rights authority could be 
entrusted.” See Alston, at 836.
35 Gudrun Zagel (2004), “The WTO and Trade-Related Human Rights Measures: Trade 
Sanctions Vs. Trade Incentives”, 9 Austrian Review of International and European 
Law 119 at 135.
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Convention on the Law of Treaties guide the interpretation of WTO 
agreements.36 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides for reliance upon 
supplementary means of interpretation which includes both the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances surrounding the treaty’s conclusion.37 
Looking into the negotiating history is one of the means of interpretation that 
falls within the ambit of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.38
Hence, the interpretation of Article XX in light of its negotiating history 
indicates that the negotiating parties never intended for the enforcement of 
human rights to constitute an exception under Article XX.39 Even Article 7 of 
the Havana Charter of ITO, the provision often cited by some as a historical 
legal basis for trade measures against human rights violations40 does not allow 
countries to take trade measures on grounds of human rights violations in the 
territory of another country. It rather focuses on the link between labour and 
productivity. Article 7 of the Havana Charter provides:
The Members recognize that measures relating to employment must take 
fully into account the rights of workers under inter-governmental 
declarations, conventions and agreements. They recognize that all countries 
have a common interest in the achievement and maintenance of fair labour 
standards related to productivity, and thus in the improvement of wages and 
working conditions as productivity may permit. The Members recognize that 
unfair labour conditions, particularly in production for export, create 
difficulties in international trade, and, accordingly, each Member shall take 
whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions 
within its territory.41
Eres contends that if Article 7 was so concerned with human rights, it would not 
have focused on productivity by using the phrase ‘labor standards related to 
productivity.’ He further argues that to condition maintenance of labor standards 
on productivity is inconsistent with the rights based approach.42 Therefore, it 
would be wrong to conclude that it was linked to human rights. The provision 
also reflects the preoccupation of the negotiating parties with fair trade by 
addressing the fact that low labour standards provide some members with an 
unfair competitive advantage. Conditioning respect for labor standards on 
competitive advantage is consistent with the drafters’ intent to prevent unfair
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Articles 31-32.
Article 32 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Tatjana Eres (2004), “The Limits of GATT Article XX: A Back Door for Human 
Rights?’’, Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 35 No.3, at 605.
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Havana Charter (1948), Article 7(1).
Eres, supra note 38, at 607.
trade, not to enforce human rights.43 In sum, the context of Article 7 shows the 
intention of the drafters to prevent unfair competition specifically through the 
role of labor as a cost of production, and not for enforcement of human rights. 
Therefore, the argument that Article XX of GATT warrants the imposition of 
unilateral trade sanctions against other members on grounds of gross violations 
of human rights would be hardly convincing.
However, it is important to note that members may take trade measures based 
on the security exceptions enshrined in Article XXi. wTO members may 
deviate from their obligations under the GATT provided that they do so under 
some conditions and to protect their essential security interests. Members can 
take any measure they deem appropriate in relation with the trafficking of arms 
or trafficking in any other goods which are intended for the purpose of 
supplying a military establishment.44 As can be seen from this provision, 
countries may unilaterally put restrictions on the flow of goods only when such 
goods are to be used for a military establishment.
Moreover, members may take trade measures that are necessary for the 
maintenance of peace and security in pursuance of their obligations under the 
United Nations’ Charter (UN Charter).45 Trade measures can be authorized as 
economic sanctions by the UN Security Council within the system of collective 
security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.46 Hence, the Security Council can 
authorize multilateral trade sanctions in order to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. Article XXI(c) of the GATT allows WTO members to 
impose trade sanctions only when the Security Council calls upon countries for 
multilateral action which may include trade embargo. However, unilateral trade 
sanctions are neither covered under Article XXI exception of the GATT nor 
under the UN Charter.
3. Extraterritorial Application, Process-Production 
Methods (PPMs) under GATT 1994 and Human Rights
In dealing with Article XX of GATT, we also need to see the extraterritorial 
application of this provision. Taking trade measures on the basis of human 
rights violations that happen in another country shall be based on WTO rules. 
However, Article XX does not allow countries to take trade measures for acts
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done in another country. In other words, the provision does not have 
extraterritorial application.
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has not yet conclusively decided 
on the issue of extraterritorial application of Article XX of GATT in relation to 
human rights. However, this issue has been incidentally examined in the context 
of environmental concerns which could indicate the position of the DSB. In a 
case involving Mexico and the United States (Tuna -Dolphin case), Mexico 
challenged the use of a ban on imports by the United States and the Panel ruling 
on the issue of extraterritoriality stated that:
Nothing in Article XX entitled any contracting party to impose measures in 
the implementation of which the jurisdiction of one contracting party would 
be subordinated to the legislation of another contracting party. It could be 
deduced from the letter and spirit of Article XX that it was confined to 
measures contracting parties could adopt or apply within or from their own 
territory. To accept that one contracting party might impose trade restrictions 
to conserve the resources of another contracting party would have the 
consequence of introducing the concept of extraterritoriality into the GATT, 
which would be extremely dangerous for all contracting parties.47
The ruling shows that using trade measures for events that happen outside the 
jurisdiction of a country is dangerous for the promotion of international trade 
and it is not also supported by Article XX of GATT. Therefore, taking trade 
sanctions on grounds of human rights violations in another country adversely 
affects the promotion of international trade. Moreover, as confirmed by the 
Panel, such measure is not warranted under the GATT.
There is a decision by the DSB of the WTO regarding environmental issues 
which might be in apparent contradiction with the above decision. It appears 
that in Shrimp- Turtle case some extraterritorial measures fall within Article XX 
exceptions as both the Panel and the Appellate Body accepted that the measures 
taken by the US to protect sea turtles which were outside US territorial waters 
was acceptable.48 This may be viewed as the extraterritorial application of 
Article XX of GATT. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body explicitly stated that it 
was not deciding the issue of jurisdiction on the basis of WTO law. The 
Appellate Body stated that “we do not pass upon the question of whether there is 
an implied jurisdictional limitation in Article XX (g) and if so, the nature and 
extent of the limitation” and it noted that “in the specific circumstances of the 
case before us there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered 
marine populations involved and the United States for the purpose of Article XX
47 GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States: Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 
16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.), (1993), para 170.
48 Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, (WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998) (Hereinafter US-Shrimp case).
(g)”.49 Thus, the Appellate Body found that the extraterritorial measure by the 
US was acceptable not because it was convinced that the provision permits 
taking measures for acts outside the jurisdiction of a country but because the act 
outside the jurisdiction of the US involved the interest of the US in its marine 
population.
Hence, extraterritorial application of Article XX of the GATT can hardly be 
valid for human right violations that happen outside one’s own jurisdiction. 
Therefore, imposing trade sanctions against another member on grounds of 
human rights violations that happen outside the territory of a given country 
appears to lack a legal back up under the GATT.
The trade measures against human right violations also raise the issue of 
distinction in process-production methods (PPMs) as there is a question whether 
GATT measures apply only to the final product or to the methods of production 
as well. Human rights issues can arise in connection with violations that may 
occur in the process of production, in cases such as child labour and forced 
labour.
The WTO has not decided on the validity of human rights PPMs but its 
decision on environment PPMs may give some clue in this regard.50 The Tuna- 
Dolphin dispute involved a US restriction on the importation of tuna that had 
been caught in a manner that endangered dolphins.51 The US tried to justify the 
measure as necessary to protect animal health in Mexico. Mexico argued that 
the exception applied only to measures designed to protect the health of 
dolphins within the United States. The GATT Dispute Settlement Panel agreed 
with Mexico’s argument declaring that this was a breach of GATT norms not to 
discriminate between like products on the basis of how the products had been 
produced.52 The Panel stated:
the standard of Article iii - namely that imported products be accorded no 
less favorable treatment than domestic products - required a comparison 
between products of the exporting and importing countries, and not a 
comparison between production regulations ... that had no effect on the 
product as such. Therefore, the United States could not embargo imports of 
tuna products from Mexico simply because Mexico's regulations affecting 
the production of tuna did not satisfy United States regulations.53
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This ruling suggests that if the qualities of products meet the standards set by 
countries, then members should not impose different treatments against products 
based on the process through which they have been produced. Furthermore, this 
ruling seems to have some support by the panel in US-Shrimp case. In this case 
the panel ruled that to adopt trade restrictive measures, conditioning access to its 
market for a given product upon the adoption of certain policies by the 
exporting country would be extremely dangerous for functioning of the WTo 
multilateral trading system.54
on the contrary, some scholars argue that PPMs are allowed as per Article 
XX of GATT. The prison labour exception under Article XX(e) is mainly 
invoked to support such argument. For instance, Bal rejects the argument that 
products should not be banned from being imported or restricted quantitatively 
on the basis of the process in which they have been produced. Bal contends that 
Article XX (e) which deals with prison labour does not have anything to do with 
the final product. it deals with the products manufactured using prison labour in 
another country. Hence, it is related to the process of how the product is made. 
Eventually, such provision which permits trade action on the basis of how a 
product is produced can be used in dealing with issues of human rights by 
analogy.55
54 US-Shrimp turtle case, para 7.45. The Panel in this case noted that “In our view, if an 
interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX were to be followed which would allow a 
Member to adopt measures conditioning access to its market for a given product upon 
the adoption by the exporting Members of certain policies, including conservation 
policies, GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement could no longer serve as a 
multilateral framework for trade among Members as security and predictability of 
trade relations under those agreements would be threatened. This follows because, if 
one WTO Member were allowed to adopt such measures, then other Members would 
also have the right to adopt similar measures on the same subject but with differing, 
or even conflicting, requirements. if that happened, it would be impossible for 
exporting Members to comply at the same time with multiple conflicting policy 
requirements. Indeed, as each of these requirements would necessitate the adoption of 
a policy applicable not only to export production (such as specific standards 
applicable only to goods exported to the country requiring them) but also to domestic 
production, it would be impossible for a country to adopt one of those policies 
without running the risk of breaching other Members' conflicting policy requirements 
for the same product and being refused access to these other markets. We note that, in 
the present case, there would not even be the possibility of adapting one's export 
production to the respective requirements of the different Members. Market access 
for goods could become subject to an increasing number of conflicting policy 
requirements for the same product and this would rapidly lead to the end of the WTO 
multilateral trading system.”
55 Bal, supra note 14, at 86.
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However, as explained earlier, the historical context of this provision 
suggests that the purpose of this provision is not to address human rights 
concerns but rather protection of products manufactured through normal labour 
force against competition of products manufactured through unfair labour.
4. Ineffectiveness of Trade Sanctions to Enforce Human 
Rights Protection
Countries take trade sanctions to make sure that allegedly repressive 
governments comply with human rights standards. However, many trade 
sanctions intended to assure respect for human rights have failed to bring about 
the compliance of the violators of human rights. Rather, they may be counter 
productive resulting in further violations of human rights.
Trade or economic sanctions are controversial measures. Proponents of trade 
sanctions assert that sanctions can bring about the necessary restraint on 
authoritarian governments on their violation of human rights.56 They argue that 
these sanctions oblige a repressive regime to comply with the conditions set by 
the country imposing the sanction.57
On the other hand, free trade economists and many developing countries 
generally oppose the linkage between human rights and trade sanctions.58 They 
argue that such linkage works against the promotion of welfare. They also 
contend that it is to the disadvantage of the economy of developing countries as 
it limits their export to the fullest extent possible. what is more, linking trade 
with human rights would deprive the developing countries of their comparative 
advantage in the use of cheap labour.59 Developing countries may not 
effectively use their cheap labour for the fear that trade sanctions might be 
imposed by the developed world on grounds of violations of labour standards. 
Hence, the linkage opens a door for abuse. This leads to the use of trade 
measures simply for a protectionist purpose.60
Moreover, there is evidence that trade or economic sanctions are not 
effective to bring about the desired result. Hence, some argue that trade 
sanctions particularly unilateral sanctions should not be employed, and suggest 
that countries should rather resort to constructive engagement. The principle 
behind this argument is that economic transactions will create capital flows and
56
57
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60
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these capital flows which create new jobs and increase production will 
ultimately lead to political and social changes.61 It is also argued that 
constructive engagement expands the middle class.62
it is conceivable that the expansion of the middle class will improve the 
social and economic rights of citizens. Advocates of economic engagement also 
contend that “increased economic and social wealth for the citizens of the target 
country and its increased presence in the world community, will generally lead 
to faster improvement in the political and social situation than with sanctions”.63 
It is argued that a “country and its political and social climate” can benefit from 
“the influence of wealth, security and foreign values” and that “a restrictive or 
repressive state”, may ‘evolve’ “into a more open, protective state cognizant of, 
and responsive to, its citizens’ appeals for change. This evolution would be 
aided by private and public appeals to the government for change”.64
China can be cited as an example where some improvement has been 
observed after the country opened its door for trade and foreign investment. it is 
also argued that the economic transaction coupled with the exposure to the 
international world will prompt the citizens mainly the middle class to demand 
more freedom and respect for human rights.65 As more economic transaction 
develops “a middle class motivated by the taste of what economic and social 
freedoms have to offer—will develop with the intense desire to change the 
government and the increased power to do so”.66
one of the strongest arguments against trade sanctions is that the general 
public often is most hurt rather than the political elite.67 Those who control 
power will have different mechanisms in place to make sure that they get what 
they want. On the contrary, the general public who does not have many choices 
will suffer. Especially, sanctions will be counterproductive due to job losses and
61
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deepening poverty.68 This would in turn exacerbate the human rights situation in 
the state concerned.
One study on effectiveness of economic sanctions concludes from an 
analysis of more than hundred cases that they have worked only in about one 
third of the cases.69 Many trade sanctions have done little to hurt those in power 
and failed to ensure human rights are respected.70 This is on account of the fact 
that the targeted regimes are able to develop alternative means of circumventing 
the sanctions. There is evidence that even multilateral trade restrictive measures 
rarely stop human rights abuse because there is a high incentive for trading 
partners to disregard the sanction.71 For instance, states had a high incentive to 
violate multilateral trade sanctions against Iraq.72 There is evidence that France 
and Germany secretly traded with Iraq.73
A prime example where unilateral trade sanctions have failed to bring 
compliance with human rights standards is Burma (Myanmar).74 The people of 
Myanmar live under an authoritarian regime that is widely condemned for its 
repressive policies and serious human right abuses.75 Military regimes in one 
form or another have controlled Burma for over 40 years.76 After its 
independence in 1948 from Britain until 1962, Myanmar had a parliamentary 
democracy under the elected leadership of prime minister U Nu.77 It was in 1962 
that General Ne Win came to power by overthrowing the elected civilian
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government.78 After 25 years military rule, in 1988, the people of Myanmar 
demonstrated against the regime. The military government suppressed those 
demonstrations killing hundreds of protestors, and subsequently imprisoning 
many in harsh and fatal conditions.79
in the 1990s the occasional public protest that was suppressed through arrest 
and imprisoning anyone who advocated for human rights and democracy.80 The 
military government’s human rights record remains very poor with repression of 
political opposition, forced labour, ethnic persecution, and lack of religious 
freedom even after the year 2000.81
In response to the human right violations in Myanmar, trade and other types 
of measures have been taken by the US. In 1989 the United States suspended 
millions of dollars in aid and requested other countries to take similar 
measures.82 The United States also suspended Myanmar’s preferred trading 
status in the same year on grounds of human right violations. 83 In 1990 the 
United States adopted legislation which empowered the president to take 
economic sanctions as the president thinks appropriate provided that the 
Myanmar military government fails to take steps for democratization.84
In 1996 president Clinton signed into law the 1997 Foreign Operations Act 
which gave the president the discretion to prohibit individuals in the US from 
initiating investments in Myanmar.85 It was followed by an executive order 
implementing the provisions in the Foreign operations Appropriations Act 
which prohibited any new investment in Myanmar and expansion of trade 
commitments.86 Furthermore, in response to the report of 2002 and arrest of the
78 Michael Ewing-chow (2007), “First Do No Harm: Myanmar Trade Sanctions and 
Human Rights”, Northwestern Journal of International human Rights, Vol. 5, issue 2 
at 154.
79 Daley, supra note 75.
80 Baker, supra note 63.
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opposition leader, the US enacted the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 
2003 (BFDA) which banned the importation of any goods produced, 
manufactured, grown or assembled in Myanmar.87 EU and Canada also imposed 
economic and other sanctions against Myanmar.88 They had taken unilateral 
economic sanctions in different occasions.
Despite the economic pressures against Myanmar for two decades, the 
measures could not be of any good in ensuring respect for human rights in 
Myanmar. Two decades of economic sanctions have not brought about 
meaningful human rights improvements and this suggests that there is 
diminishing prospect for success.89
However, as of 2010 some reforms are being introduced which could be the 
start of a democratic reform in the country. After the 2010 elections, the pro­
democracy leader Suu Kyi was released from house arrest.90 in 2011 a civilian 
government was sworn in and introduced some political and economic 
reforms.91 Following such reforms, EU and other western countries have eased 
trade sanctions.92 The country has also been visited by world leaders such as 
Prime Minister David Cameron93 and US President Obama.94
87 Id at 157.
88 When Myanmar declined a request by EU for investigation into its forced labor 
practices and in response to a complaint by European trade unions, the European 
Commission for the first time exercised the human rights clause of the European 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program to terminate Myanmar’s GSP 
trade benefits on industrial exports to the EU. See Cleveland, supra note 82 at 10. In 
1997 the EU revoked Myanmar’s benefits under the Generalized System of 
Preferences which affected 5% of Myanmar’s exports. In 2003 the EU decided to 
impose new expanded sanctions. See Ewing- Chow, supra note 78 at 159. In 1997, 
Canada also withdrew General Preferential Tariff benefits from Myanmar and 
required all Canadian firms trading in Myanmar to get export permits. (See, Human 
Rights Watch, World Report 1998, at 162).
89 Nyun, supra note 2 at 485.
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91 Ibid.
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Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19633062dAccessed on October 
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What led to the introduction of reforms in Myanmar should further be 
analyzed. It can, however, be argued that unilateral sanctions for more than two 
decades had little contribution toward the introduction of reforms in the country. 
This is because if sanctions had significant effect in bringing such reforms, the 
country would have responded so early to the trade sanctions that have been in 
place for more than two decades. Even when it is argued that they had 
significant contribution, the misery and the human rights violations inflicted 
upon the people of Myanmar as a result of the trade sanctions makes such 
measures unappealing and undesirable.
Apart from the inefficacy of unilateral trade measures to induce respect for 
human rights, the fact that such measures exacerbate human right violations 
makes the measures unacceptable. As Margaret Doxey rightly argues, for the 
target governments “survival is all-important and their control of the levers of 
power, which may actually be enhanced by sanctions, enables them to shift any 
burden of hardship onto the mass of the people95.” Hence, unilateral sanctions 
bring unintended consequences on the population and the consequences of such 
measures are unbearable for the general public.
For Instance, in Myanmar, sanctions brought the loss of 60,000 jobs in the 
textile industry alone and a decrease in per capita income from Us $ 225 in 
2004 to US $ 145 in 2005 thereby exacerbating the suffering of the general 
population.96 The sanctions also resulted in an estimated loss of 40,000 jobs in 
the garment industry.97 Since many of the workers laid off in this industry were 
women, some of them have been forced into prostitution as a means of 
livelihood for their families.98 Such circumstances clearly expose women for 
health problems including the risk to life. Generally, the trade sanctions brought 
about severe consequences on the innocent citizens of Myanmar adversely 
affecting their human rights to health, life as well as the right to adequate 
standards of living.
US unilateral trade sanctions against Cuba since the 1960 are also examples 
for the inefficacy of such measures.99 The main reason for such sanctions was 
the alleged failure of the Cuban government to comply with fundamental rights. 
However, the sanctions have not brought about the desired result. The unilateral 
trade sanctions against Cuba by the U.S. have brought about devastating effects 
on the health and life of the people as well as the economy of the country.
95
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U.S. trade sanctions generally led to severe food shortages that caused 
widespread nutritional deficiencies and disease.100 The trade sanctions have also 
been linked to epidemics of specific diseases, including neurological disorders 
and blindness caused by poor nutrition.101 Such sanctions in different periods 
have led to shortages of medical supplies which resulted in series of medical 
crises and heightened levels of infectious diseases.102 The sanctions have also 
brought about increase in food prices which in turn hindered many people from 
purchasing enough food for living. Hence, many Cubans were deprived of 
exercising their human rights to health, the right to adequate of standards of 
living and the right to food as a result of the unilateral economic sanctions 
imposed against Cuba. Such measures that have unintended humanitarian 
consequences against innocent citizens are thus hardly appropriate.
Conclusion
Unilateral trade sanctions as a response to human rights abuses can be 
challenged from two perspectives: impact and legality under the wTO regime. 
while the objective of promoting human rights through unilateral trade 
sanctions may sound positive, it is not the most effective weapon to ensure that 
repressive governments comply with basic standards of human rights. Many 
unilateral trade sanctions have done little to force those in power to comply with 
human rights standards. Even worse, unilateral trade sanctions are often counter­
productive because they have unintended consequences on the general 
population who live in the target country. Unilateral trade sanctions have hurt 
most the general population than the repressive governments. Hence, apart from 
the inefficacy of trade measures to induce respect for human rights, the fact that 
such measures have unintended humanitarian consequences on the public at 
large render this approach unacceptable.
Unilateral trade sanctions may have a symbolic significance to send a 
message that the human rights situation in the target country would not be 
tolerated. in spite of their symbolic significance, however, such measures are
100 Alberto R. Coll, (2007) “Harming Human Rights in the Name of Promoting Them: 
The Case of the Cuban Embargo”,12 UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign 
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at 521.
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usually weak in bringing about tangible human right changes. Constructive 
engagement is thus more productive to achieve human rights reforms. Imposing 
unilateral trade sanctions and following a ‘wait and see policy’ to lift such 
sanctions until such time that human rights are respected in the country does not 
appear to be a sound approach.
Moreover, the legality of unilateral trade sanctions under the WTO 
Agreements has been controversial. While exceptions of some of the WTO 
Agreements such as GATT Article XX accommodate some human rights, they 
are applied to address human rights concerns within one’s own territory. Article 
XX of the GATT allows measures to protect human life and health i.e. 
protection of the human right to life and health. However, its application is 
limited in the sense that derogation from the WTO rules can be made only to 
address public concerns within domestic jurisdiction. The WTO rules do not, 
arguably, authorize countries to take outwardly directed unilateral trade 
sanctions against target countries. Article XX does not warrant extraterritorial 
application. Hence, unilateral trade sanctions against target countries on grounds 
of human rights violations are neither permitted under WTO rules nor effective 
mechanisms to ensure respect for human rights.
Furthermore, GATT Article XXI and the UN Charter do not authorize 
unilateral trade sanctions as a weapon to promote human rights. Of course, the 
security Council can authorize multilateral trade sanctions in order to maintain 
or restore international peace and security. Article XXI(c) of the GATT also 
allows WTO members to impose trade sanctions when the security Council 
calls upon countries for multilateral action which may include trade embargo. 
However, unilateral trade sanctions are neither covered under Article XXI 
exception of the GATT nor under the UN Charter.
This is not to suggest that repressive regimes should be given free ride to do 
whatever they please in the course of their gross violation of human rights. 
Rather, the task of regulating gross human rights violations would be more 
appropriate under the United Nations which has the mandate to authorize 
multilateral trade sanctions against repressive regimes. In fact, even a 
comprehensive multilateral trade sanction authorized by the UN has unintended 
consequences and may not also be effective to bring about the desired result. 
However, the UN can resort to specific sanctions, as it sometimes does, rather 
than imposing comprehensive multilateral trade sanctions with a view to 
minimize the cost of such sanctions on the general population, and at the same 
time to duly exert pressure against the human rights abuses. _________ ■
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